




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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

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


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NATO - WARSAW PACT: Soviet Response to MBFR Initiative

//The Soviets probably will move quickly to discredit the NATO draft treaty that may be introduced soon at the MBFR talk.//

//The NATO initiative, which is to be announced by President Reagan today in Bonn, calls for a single comprehensive accord. NATO and Warsaw Pact participants would agree to reach collective ceilings in central Europe of about 900,000 ground and air force personnel, including approximately 700,000 ground force personnel, for each side.//

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//Four reduction stages are envisaged, each subject to verification. The US and the USSR would be the only countries to have specific subceilings on ground forces, and they would withdraw 13,000 and 30,000 troops respectively in the first stage.//

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Comment: //The Soviets will try to prevent the West from seizing the initiative in Vienna and from using this MFBR proposal to complement US INF and START proposals. Moscow publicly will welcome the NATO proposal as a response to the draft treaty the East submitted in February, but will probably depict it as inadequate. The Soviets may cite a recent West German press leak that provided details of the draft treaty to claim that the West is only repackaging earlier proposals.//

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//Eventually the Soviets probably will reject the NATO proposal. Its requirements for agreement on the size of the participants' forces before reductions are made and for extensive verification measures that include on-site inspections have heretofore been unacceptable to Moscow. Efforts to accommodate Eastern insistence that all direct participants agree to binding commitments for troop reductions before they begin will be welcomed but will be criticized as weak and vague.//

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//The USSR continues to understate Warsaw Pact troop strength in Central Europe and probably will continue to reject attempts to resolve this longstanding data dispute because it apparently believes it has no reason to surrender the Warsaw Pact's estimated 200,000-man advantage in the region. Instability in Eastern Europe probably increases the Soviet unwillingness to accept Warsaw Pact reductions that would have to be three times larger than NATO's in order to reach the projected 900,000-man ceiling.//

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CUBA-US: Negative View of Negotiations

//A senior Cuban party official's remarks last month to a Western ambassador in Havana indicate that the Castro regime does not believe the US will participate in negotiations on regional problems.//

[redacted]

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//The remarks contrast with earlier statements to the chief of the US Interests Section by First Vice President Raul Castro, in which he underscored the "seriousness" of Cuba's interest in engaging Washington in negotiations. The party official, who heads the North American section of the party's foreign policy apparatus, said Havana had concluded that the US intends to ignore bilateral channels and plans to resolve its problems with Cuba by raising them at a US-Soviet summit.//

[redacted]

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//The official stressed that close ties with Moscow and strong support for Latin American revolutionary movements comprise the cornerstone of Havana's foreign policy. He said the next 10 years would see a resurgence of revolutionary spirit, with Central America as its focal point.//

[redacted]

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Comment: //The official's comments reflect the limited nature of Cuba's recent offers to negotiate on Central America and Havana's unswerving intention of maintaining its commitment to revolutionaries in the region. The comments also indicate the depth of Cuban resentment--largely President Castro's personal pique--over Washington's practice of dealing with Havana through Moscow.//

[redacted]

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//Despite the official's negative views, Cuba probably will continue to push for talks for propaganda reasons. Castro, however, will adopt a more aggressive course if calls for talks give the impression that Havana is operating from a position of weakness.//

[redacted]

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
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MOROCCO-EGYPT: High-Level Contact

Moroccan Foreign Minister Boucetta, carrying an undisclosed message from King Hassan, held talks with Egyptian President Mubarak in Cairo yesterday. Boucetta is the first senior Arab official other than Sudanese President Nimeiri and Omani Sultan Qaboos to visit Cairo since most Arab states severed ties with Egypt in 1979. At the end of the visit, Egypt and Morocco denounced Israel's invasion of Lebanon. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Both countries hope that Morocco's initiative will encourage other Arab states to restore more open contact with Egypt. There are no indications, however, that any other such visits are imminent. Although earlier reporting indicated that Morocco might establish diplomatic ties with Egypt as early as this fall, Rabat is likely to proceed cautiously and gauge the reaction of Saudi Arabia and other Arab states before restoring full diplomatic relations. [REDACTED]

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BAHAMAS: Election Outlook

//Parliamentary elections tomorrow are expected to return Prime Minister Pindling to power for a fourth five-year term. Pindling's party has an efficient patronage machine and the financial and organizational resources to carry a majority of the 43 seats at stake. The opposition party has tried to capitalize on widespread public dissatisfaction with a stagnant economy, increased labor unrest and mounting evidence of corruption linked to Pindling's close associates. In addition, official complacency over growing crime and drug trafficking is being used by the opposition in its appeals for a change.//

[redacted]

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Comment: //Both major parties are middle of the road, and the outcome will have no significant effect on relations with the US. Negotiation of a base renewal agreement for important US military facilities on the islands is the only contentious bilateral issue. Pindling hopes that a decisive victory will strengthen his demands for retroactive payment for the leased properties.//

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